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Abstract
Mobile devices offer users a constant connection to information and entertainment. Our
society has become hyperconnected. We have unprecedented access to information at any time
of the day. Mobile devices have the potential to make people more efficient and productive or
more distracted and negatively influenced. The use of applications or apps on mobile devices
brings with them unparalleled access to intimate information about the users of mobile devices.
Corporations have been quick to provide apps that make life easier for, or entertain, the endusers. But the entertainment and access come at a price. That price is incredibly detailed
information about the users, and it is being used and sold on the internet. Companies are
requiring users to allow mobile applications access to far more detailed information than is
necessary, and the end-user is unaware of just what the price they are paying is. This paper will
explore the permissions that mobile apps request, a company’s terms of service, and third-party
relationships to determine if software manufacturers are honest with their stated permissions or if
apps are overreaching in their efforts to collect information about their users. An examination of
application permissions and analysis of the data transmissions to and from the device on behalf
of the application will be performed. This work aims to provide users with more insight into how
to protect their confidential data and to improve users’ perception of privacy.
Keywords: Digital Privacy, Social Media, Personal Information, Mobile Apps
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
The proliferation of mobile devices around the globe has created a society of hyperconnected people willing to share extremely personal information in exchange for convenience
and entertainment. Social media services such as Facebook, YouTube, Snapchat, Twitter, and the
like provide the pulse of society and allow people from every corner of the globe to connect in a
myriad of ways. While these services cost nothing to the consumer, the budgets to support the
digital infrastructure of these companies is astronomical. YouTube’s annual operating costs
alone are around $6.3 billion and produces only 6% of Google’s ad sales revenue. Through the
use of apps on mobile devices, many companies collect information from users while they
interact with their app as a way to generate revenue by selling that information. However, some
apps request more access to a device than is necessary for the tasks performed by the application.
Other third-party applications are also common and collect data for monetization on behalf of the
primary application or corporation.
Divided amongst various categories of applications and depending on the software
platform of Apple or Android, there are hundreds of thousands of third-party tracking
applications in the mobile app ecosystem. Unfortunately, the process of collection and
monetization of personal data through the use of apps on mobile devices is largely not
understood by the people who use those devices (Keng, 2016). Rajasegaran, Karunanayake,
Gunathillake, Seneviratne, and Jourjon (2019) also exposed over 1,500 mobile applications that
required unnecessary permissions to users’ mobile devices and another 1,400 apps that utilized at
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least five software libraries directed at the collection of information for the purposes of
delivering targeting marketing.
By examining the permissions requested by an app, the apps terms of service, and the
actual data transmitted from the devices, it can be determined if the apps are taking liberties with
user’s data. From these results, cross-examination can be performed to determine where the data
is being sent and what companies are benefitting from the excessive data collection. Lastly, when
a device owner decides to upgrade or trade-in their old devices, a forensic examination of what
happens to the existing data can be done to determine if a factory reset actually removes a user’s
data or is it a false sense of security when it comes to personal data stored on a mobile device?
Until the users of mobile devices and applications choose to protect against the excessive
and unregulated collection of personal data, they will continue to be manipulated by corporations
through the virtually unfettered access to personal information.
Problem Statement
Widespread and daily use of mobile devices has created an economy of data that flows
from the user to the corporation. Much of the data that is collected is done without the users’
knowledge or even their active participation. A simple “I Agree” button is all it takes for a
person to be a more valuable source of revenue than the products or services that a company
sells. Applications are potentially understating the system permissions granted to the app, by the
user, allowing for more access to data then a user expects. Some app vendors allow third-party
marketing companies to “tag-along” on a user’s device and collect even more personal
information, including sensor data, geolocation information, and other unintentional user data.
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When a company or service vendor application requests certain permissions to the user’s
device, those permissions are intended to benefit the user of the app by allowing the app to
perform some function in tight relation to the functionality of the app. However, when an
application that has no need for access to the device’s camera, requests such access, the user is
faced with the choice of allowing the access or not using the app. In addition, the terms of
service for the application may or may not provide any additional protections for the end-user
and may in fact be even more liberal with the data that is collected.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
By the year 2025, it is estimated that 72% of internet usage will be consumed through a
mobile device (Handley, 2019). When corporations offer no-cost services to end-users, where
does the revenue needed for that company to operate come from? According to Facebook’s 10-K
Security Exchange Commission filing (a report that gives a comprehensive summary of a
company’s financial performance), in 2012, each user of the service contributed $5.32 purely by
using Facebook (United States Security and Exchange Commission, 2012). That number has
grown to $6.09 in September of 2018. While the number may seem insignificant, consider when
that amount is multiplied by the total user base equates to approximately $55.83 billion dollars
worldwide (FourWeekMBA, 2019). The notion that one company can earn billions of dollars
from the passive browsing of its users leads to a larger issue of applications that take more liberal
and direct advantage of end-users by collecting information about location, activities, device
usage and internet habits to manipulate what the user sees, shares or even believes.
In the documentary, The Great Hack, Amer and Noujaim (2019) exposed the use of
personal data collected by social media companies to influence United States citizens during the
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2016 election. By using data analytic and marketing company Cambridge Analytica, political
strategists utilized data collected by Facebook, indicating that there are approximately 5,000
points of personal data that is tracked for every U.S. citizen. These pieces of information are then
used to target messages, group suggestions, and news articles to the people that Cambridge
Analytica deemed as “The Persuadables” in an effort to sway them toward their political client’s
side (Amer & Noujaim, 2019).
If end-users were more aware of what information companies were collecting about them
and what those companies were doing with that data in an effort to influence the purchasing or
promotion of products they may be less inclined to click “I agree” without careful consideration
to what they might be agreeing to share with social media companies and their marketing
partners. To that end, this study will examine those processes and connections to determine if
what users agree to and what is being collected are equivalent or if the end-user is a victim
whose personal information is being used to manipulate their online experience.
Objective of the Study
The objective of this study is to determine if the terms of service and permissions
required of a mobile application are relevant and related to the operation of the application.
Additionally, this paper intends to examine the attitudes and perceptions of the end-users to
determine if the exchange of personal information for entertainment is a concern or not.
Study Questions
For this research, four essential questions were devised. These questions will help us
identify potential data abuses and help define our end-user survey.
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1. Are mobile applications collecting data unrelated to the functionality of the app? Is
there cross-application data sharing between applications from different companies?
Why does the application need the data it collects? Does the data serve a purpose in
relation to the application, or is it collected purely for the benefit of the company?
2. What data is transmitted to and from a device once the application is installed? Are
the applications utilizing the devices’ sensors, wireless network connections, and
cellular data transmission? Are the services being accessed beyond what is needed for
the application to perform its function?
3. Does performing a “factory reset on a device remove personal data artifacts? What
other means do end-users have when trying to protect their information?
4. What is the perception from the end-user’s perspective of the exchange of personal
information and digital privacy for entertainment?
Limitation of the Study
Due to the restricted accessibility to raw cellular data, the research being done on mobile
devices will be limited to the Wi-Fi transmissions. Data transmitted from applications should
remain relatively unchanged in content and purpose as the devices are designed to operate
similarly across both mediums.
Definition of Terms
Android Application Package (APK): A compressed digital package of directories and
libraries used to distribute applications on the Google Play Store.
App: An app or application is computer software, or a program, most commonly a small,
specific one used for mobile devices. The term app originally referred to any mobile or desktop
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application, but as more app stores have emerged to sell mobile apps to smartphone and tablet
users, the term has evolved to refer to small programs that can be downloaded and installed all at
once.
Average Revenue Per User (ARPU): ARPU is a measurement that companies use to
indicate how much money a single user is worth to the company. This amount can be regional,
national, or global in averages. For example, the ARPU for a North American user of Facebook
is $27.61, but a global ARPU for a Facebook user is $6.09 (McFarlane, 2019).
EXIF: An exchangeable image file format is a data format standard for images and
sound, which allows for additional data tags to be used to provide metadata such as geolocation
information, device settings, and technical information.
Fiddler: Fiddler is an HTTP protocol debugging tool that allows the user to log and
analyze web traffic between devices.
Data Point: A specific piece of information about an internet user. Collection of users
“likes,” “shares,” posts, and locations, all create data points that allow companies to target
specific experiences and messages to the end-user.
HTTP/HTTPS: Hypertext Transfer Protocol is a communication protocol designed for
the formatting and presentation of internet website traffic processed by internet web browsers.
iOS: Apple Inc. operating system found in mobile devices created by the Apple
corporation. Found on iPhone, iPod, and iPad devices.
Metadata: Descriptive information about a piece of data. Metadata can include creation
date, user information, geo-location information, timestamps, file permissions, and the like.
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Packet Capture: The process of intercepting or “capturing” network traffic across
various mediums and devices in order to analyze and monitor communications between systems.
SD/MicroSD Card: Small removable device for storing data on computing devices.
Micro SD cards are typically the size of a fingernail and fit into a small slot on a mobile device
allowing for additional storage of files and media.
Sensor: An electronic component designed to capture input from the environment to
provide feedback to applications and systems within the device.
Social Context: Social context is information that highlights a friend’s connections with
a brand or business. Facebook utilizes social context when selling marketing opportunities to
advertisers and marketing groups to better target future ads and influencing articles.
Social Contract: The social contract in regard to privacy, social media, and mobile
devices is defined as the agreement between the user and the social media company. Often the
social contract includes some protection of the user and, in the case of digital privacy, an
expectation of what is being done with the users’ data.
Packet Capture: Packet capture is the process of intercepting a data packet that is
crossing or moving over a specific computer network and saving that information for future
analysis.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): A set of processes, policies, software, and hardware
used to create an exchange of keys used to encrypt and decrypt data on the internet using digital
certificates that are unique to each user or device.
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WireShark: Wireshark is an industry-standard network packet analyzer. It allows the
user to examine data sent across a communication medium such as network cable or wireless
transmission.
Summary
The first part of this paper presents the issues at hand regarding personal information, and
the access companies gain thorough mobile device application permissions in an effort to
monetize the end-user. The questions presented will lead to a better understanding of how
advertisers gain access to and collect information about the user’s habits and activities. The
terms explained allow readers of various technical knowledge to process the research with a
better understanding of the technical issues. The next chapter of this research paper will be an
examination of existing research and information regarding how user data is collected and what
permissions apps have to a user’s device. Additional review of research related to how social
media’s partnerships with third-party advertising companies might affect decisions into what
permissions an application requests and what is done with such information.

17
Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter provides a review of existing literature and research in the area of mobile
device permissions, digital privacy in relation to mobile applications, and the collection of user
information by mobile devices and applications. This information will provide a thorough
examination of the various pieces of the puzzle that mobile app permissions and potential
overreach of those apps and their parent companies are participating in. In addition, how
information regarding privacy ratings is presented in the various application stores influences
user decisions to install and trust the app or not.
Background Related to the Problem
To better understand the problem, background on the issues, and motivations for
companies to collect user data needs to be addressed. According to Cuofano (cited in
FourWeekMBA, 2019), 98% of Facebook’s revenue comes from highly targeted advertisements.
These advertisements are finely tuned based on information collected about social media users
(FourWeekMBA, 2019). Less than 2% of the revenue earns by Facebook comes from payments
that developers provide to allow the processing of payments through the Facebook payment
infrastructure (retrieved from http:fourweekmba.com). Facebook has experienced annual revenue
increases at 37%, and ad revenue of over $55 billion. One of the primary factors of their growth
is the better engagement of advertising campaigns, which leads to the heart of the problem of this
paper. Facebook uses user information to create tuned advertising and sell those advertising
opportunities to companies at a higher and higher rate because of the ability to target individuals
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based on any number of identifiable metrics. These metrics provided to Facebook purely based
on what users share by using the app (United States Security, 2012).
While Facebook is a clear and common focus for much of the research and criticism,
other companies have learned from Facebook how best to utilize the population using their apps
to generate additional revenue. The big five, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google, all
participate in the collection, sales, and profit from end-user data collection. Because of the
massive amount of digital touchpoints, a single person has in today’s hyper-connected world, it
is easy to feel like there is an invasion of privacy taking place. With the increased proliferation of
mobile devices, our digital footprint becomes even larger, and many companies are taking
advantage of users to finely tune their marking machines through overreaching permissions on
mobile devices.
Recently, former CIA contractor Edward Snowden explained that it’s not just the data
collected from applications on your phone that help in identifying and tracking what you do. He
discusses, in length, the ability for mobile devices to utilize the globally unique identification
numbers of wireless access points, cellular towers and other signal transmission devices to
triangulate a user’s location even when not actively engaged in using any specific application
(Rogan, 2019). Mr. Snowden emphasized the notion that social media and mobile devices
influence the options and position of society.
Literature Related to the Problem
Shilton and Greene (2019) poured over numerous mobile software developer forums to
discover what kind of conversations developers were having in regard to ethics in data
collection, private conversations, and other “ethical deliberations.” Shilton and Greene (2019)
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explored the discussions that were had and how developers defined and justified their concerns
regarding mobile software development. While the privacy conversations were considerably
different between iOS and Android developers, the authors found that the developers had very
similar justifications for including privacy options. Most of these justifications were based on the
moral positions of the developers, “cautionary tales” and technical rationalization to legitimize
privacy features (Martin & Shilton, 2016). The research paper explored the thoughts and
concerns of the software developers when considering what information they feel is personal or
privileged and should be treated as such. That research applies to this paper because it provides
an insight into the consideration of privacy-first or process first and whether the user is an
important piece of the development model.
Martin (2015 cited in Sarabia-Sánchez et al., 2019) researched how a person’s experience
with a product or industry related to their perception and expectation of privacy. The comparison
between individuals with more experience against those with less experience determined whether
or not an application’s use and collection of personal information met the user’s privacy
expectations. The creation of “social contracts” in relation to what information people deem
personal and why that information should be viewed as personal or private. Also, why a
company might want to collect or track that information. Martin researched how privacy norms
are developed through the lens of a social contract and to define what a privacy violation is given
the link between the social contract and end-user expectations. The research helps define the role
of the end-user and the role of the software provider or social media company in defining what
constitutes a privacy norm or expected use and protection of the end-user’s data. Martin includes
the notion that users are more willing to share information within a specific community. For
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example, participation within a particular Facebook group allows a user to enter into a state of
mind that what they share information within that group more freely because of the false notion
that the information shared is contained within that group. When in reality, the information
shared within the social groups and pages of social media sites is just as accessible and open to
the company that runs the site than it would be if it were posted or shared directly to the main
feeds of the site. The user wrongly believes that they are being discrete and discriminate in the
information they are sharing. Martin’s paper provides evidence to the effect that users are often
unaware or lead to a false sense of security when sharing information based on how the service
provider presents the social construct.
The Amer and Noujaim (2019) documentary, The Great Hack, dug deeply into the use of
Facebook’s massive data point collection of its millions of users. The digital traces that users
create as they utilize the applications provide marketers with extremely detailed information
about users’ likes, dislikes, and relationships. This data is more valuable than oil in 2019 and,
when a company gains access to this incredible resource, it can apply psychological profiling to
cultivate a narrative that has the ability to influence entire populations of people (Amer &
Noujaim, 2019). In the documentary, Cambridge University professor Aleksander Kogan
explained that app users agree to the terms of an application based, not on what it collects about
them, but what the app does for them. When a user clicks on a silly survey, they are allowing that
survey to reach through their profile and connect to every one of their contacts or friends. These
companies are using this data in ways that the end-user does not understand and does not care
about, mostly because they do not see how it affects them. There are currently no laws that
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protect the end-user from the collection of personal information in this manner because the user
agrees to share it.
The unaware user and the terms of service will be examined in this paper to determine if
the permissions granted by the user have been clearly and thoroughly represented. An effort will
be made to track and measure the various data pulls and pushes an app performs to verify what
data an application is sending and storing.
In their exploration of what they term the “privacy paradox,” researchers SarabiaSánchez, Aguado, and Martínez-Martínez (2019) produced an argument that there is no rational
connection between the emotional response to social media stimuli and the users’ discretion
when it comes to managing applications and social media services permissions to their personal
information. Sarabia-Sánchez et al. referenced the Cambridge Analytica incident and how
Facebook sold over 80 million users’ data and the fact that the fallout of that event has had
virtually no impact on the millions of users affected and influenced by Cambridge Analytica.
The authors also posited that “while privacy is a primary concern for end-users, they are just as
easily distracted from that concern in exchange for insignificant rewards or time-saving
convenience” (p. 2). The research shows that there are a number of proposals that attempt to
explain why users are so willing to forgo basic data privacy practices in regard to social media
access. Some of these explanations include the increased need for instant gratification or
psychological compensation for future rewards (Do, Martini, & Choo, 2014). Additionally, some
of the indifference to digital privacy is the notion that privacy in the modern age of the
‘omnipresent internet’ no longer actually exists. While these notions are logical from a human
emotional perspective, they are confusing when the user is suddenly concerned about a data

22
breach in which similar or less intrusive information is taken when they have clearly
demonstrated that they are willing to provide such information freely. The research done by
Sarabia-Sánchez and Martínez-Martínez provides a foundational understanding of why end-users
might not understand or even care that a particular application is misrepresenting its permissions
or access to the user’s data.
Polykalas, Prezerakos, Chrysidou, and Pylarinou (2017) stated right in the title of their
research paper that “when the service is free, the product is your data.” In their paper, the authors
examined the Google Play free app landscape to determine what the cost of a free app really is.
Their research mentioned the free apps often provide the user terms of service page similar to the
type of End-user License Agreement or EULA that users of desktop software are used to seeing,
and just as quickly dismissing. They also discovered that the free apps often do not include any
way to modify the permissions that the application claims once the app has been installed. Since
the end-users do not read the full contents of the agreement, they are arbitrarily choosing to
accept the terms and give little thought of the access these applications have to their data once
they start using the app. Additionally, their paper examined over 500 free applications and
categorizes them by the types of access, how many times they were installed, and what ratings
users have given these apps. The results of this research showed that the permission requests
were vague, stating things like “Access to Wi-Fi” but, when the authors explored the definition
of such permissions, they discovered that the extent of that access was much more than the
average users really understood. From a security perspective, access to the Wi-Fi connection
means that all data traversing that connection could be captured. The most common permission
requested was access to the users “Photo/Media/Files” which ultimately allowed the software to
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access every file on the mobile device. This research directly relates to this paper in that this
paper intends to examine similar claims in both the Android and Apple software repositories.
In a related paper, Sleeper et al. (2018) approached the issue of digital privacy from a
slightly different but still very relevant angle. In her paper, she examines the effect of hardship
on an end user’s perception of how important privacy is and what challenges those with
economic difficulties face. Through a focused qualitative study of residents of transitional
homeless shelter, Sleeper et al. explored what the issues were regarding digital security and
privacy. Their findings showed that four major factors came to light that affected the user’s
positions on digital privacy. Those issues included financial resources, unreliable devices,
personal relationships, and stress. The financial resources issue presented itself as a failure to be
able to purchase reliable or up to date mobile devices. This leads to older protocols, and other
inherent security issues with the device itself as well as limitations to software updates as older
devices are often unable to run the latest versions of operating systems. The issue of personal
relationships presents the issue of partner abuse and the higher ratio of online stalking and
harassment.
The importance of these issues should not be ignored in the greater examination of digital
privacy as they expose the audience of these papers to issues that are potentially unfamiliar yet
still important pieces of the overall conversation.
The Economics of Privacy by Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman (2016), takes a look at the
issue of the “value and regulation” of personal data and its use by corporations in a myriad of
ways. Acquisti et al. pointed out that personal information is not just the height, weight economic
status of an individual but also their digital experiences such as each mouse click, media post,
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and photo upload. How all of these provide companies with abundant economic value. The
problem arises when the user suddenly feels as if the personal benefits of using an application in
exchange for personal information is no longer equitable. At one point in the paper, they made a
rather poignant point, “Privacy is not the opposite of sharing - rather, is control over sharing.”
This tends to be the heart of the matter, and where much of the disagreement on personal
data collection occurs. As much of the research has shown, there is a perception that most users
have that is used to determine if they are sharing enough, too much, or being taken advantage of.
Literature Related to the Methodology
Wu, Chen, and Clarke (2014) produced a paper titled Sensitive Data Protection on
Mobile Devices, which addressed how sensitive data is stored and can leak from mobile devices.
Wu et al. described the various data transfer methods such as computer to computer, mobile to
mobile and mobile to the server. For the purposes of this paper, the transmission from mobile to
the server (or service provider) will be examined. Wu et al. continued to describe the types of
data a mobile device can store, such as personal information, device sensor, and GPS
information as well as metadata related to the creation and modification of data on the device.
The authors presented three possible ways to protect the data on the device, which includes
backing up the information to a secondary location, apply encryption to the information, and
securing the device with a “lock and wipe code.” The lock and wipe code would force the device
to lock after failed attempts to access the device and then perform a factory reset of the device.
The section on “lock and wipe” directly applies to the research that will be done in this paper as
we explore the functionality of the “factory reset” to determine if the personal information and
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metadata of the device are truly deleted from the device or if any of it can be recovered by thirdparty software.
Arapinis, Mancini, Ritter, and Ryan (2017) examined mobile devices from an
attacker/target perspective. The applied research identified that mobile device permissions and
security policies need to be reworked to include the multitude of sensors and data that the device
itself produces. Often the device is generating this information without the input or knowledge of
the end-user. As a result, end-users rarely, if ever, acknowledge that there is a privacy issue.
Arapinis et al. proposed a formal verification methodology to better define a set of standard
permissions, or at the very least, a level of access that all end-users might agree upon that
software creators should abide by. Which he admits would be difficult since users share
information differently with different people and in different situations. The authors proceeded to
diagram and describe the various methods of attack on a mobile device to further illustrate the
difficulty in securing mobile devices. Lastly, using WireShark, the authors captured
transmissions from mobile devices to take a more detailed look at some of the security protocols.
What they discovered was that even one of their fundamental security standards, a particular
algorithmic value that should be updated frequently, went unchanged for extended periods of
time, including almost three days at one point in their research, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Demonstration that the TMSI Value Has Failed to be Updated for Three Days
(Arapinis et al., 2017)
The point is made that their research is not only theoretical but also demonstrates that it is
possible for a malicious actor to manipulate the vulnerabilities to breach the user’s privacy.
Ultimately the authors’ several fixes to the problems they exposed include but not limited to PKI
at various layers and fixes to the mobile device identification algorithm.
Much of the research in mobile data security focuses on the Android environment. Slavin
et al. (2016) presented a tool to help software developers identify coding deficiencies in relation
to privacy standards and then recommend potential solutions, thus helping curb the unnecessary
overreach of some applications when requesting permissions on mobile devices. In their
research, they developed a tool that performed two major functions. The first function was to
create an ontology of security-related phrases for the applications. The second function of their
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application was to then map the phrases to functions within the Android API. Once their
application was complete, they could run any Android app through the software to compare the
byte code of the software to the privacy policy of the app to create a list of violations the ranged
in severity. Figure 2 shows the structure of the application, as created by Slavin et al (2016).

Figure 2. Diagram of PVDetector application (Slavin et al., 2016)
Choe, Jung, Lee, and Fisher (2013) approached the problem of mobile apps overreaching
for permissions by proposing a visual representation of an application’s privacy score. By
collecting information on over 100 apps in the Android and Apple stores, they created a rating
system in an attempt to help the end-user visually recognize an app that had the potential to
collect more personal data than what was advertised or presented. With this information made
available to the end-users, the second phase of the study explored what the result of having such
knowledge made on the user’s choice of applications to install on their mobile device. By
applying a visual of a privacy rating, or privacy rating and a user rating, Choe et al. surveyed 332
users to determine if users’ decisions to load an app would be influenced based on the scales
presented. Their results showed some significant results when the privacy values were
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represented in high and low privacy ratings, but little change when the apps displayed high and
medium values. Moreover, depending on how the information was framed (either negatively or
positively), users had differing opinions. As shown in Table 1, if the privacy score of an
application is presented in a negative format, users were more inclined to install that app than if
the score was represented in a positive format. However, the authors mentioned that results were
the opposite when the framing between positive and negative were done in text descriptions
rather than graphical images (i.e., plus signs vs. minus signs).
Table 1
Results of Survey Representing Privacy in a Negative or Positive Format, With or Without
Recommendation Data Support.

The information collected by Choe et al. (2013) ultimately shows that how users are
exposed to the information about the level of privacy that an app does or does not provide can
mean a world of difference when it comes to the user making an informed decision about
downloading sed app. For the purposes of this paper, the questions asked of the users will
purposely avoid any ambiguity in the survey questions.
There are several ways of mitigating or controlling over-privileged applications, but in a
paper by Do et al. (2014), one suggestion was to reverse engineer the software coming from the
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Google Play Store. Specifically, the authors suggest an approach that would examine an
application APK and the AndroidManifest.xml file where the permissions for the application are
stored. Figure 3 shows a generic APK, and Table 2 shows a list of specific permissions that each
social media apps are known to request from mobile devices. Do et al. devised a process of
unpacking the APK and modifying the XML file used to apply the permission for the application
to the mobile device the repackage the application before the mobile device installs it. In their
testing, they were careful not to remove permissions that would break the overall functionality of
the app, such as internet access for social media applications or camera access for photo-sharing
apps like Instagram.

Figure 3. Android APK Structure
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Table 2
Common App Permissions

The most difficult issue with this approach is that it could be possible for permissions to
be so intertwined with the code of the application for the permission to be removed and still have
app functionality. Additionally, as soon as an app requires an update, the entire process would
have to be repeated, and given the frequent nature of mobile app updates, this would cause a
major challenge. The remainder of the paper explored the testing of removing specific
permissions, one at a time, and recording the results of attempting to run the app. Some
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permissions allowed for the app to operate as expected until a function of the app needed access
to the data permission provided, such as READ_ CONTACTS, when Facebook attempts to find
friends. The results cause the app to crash. While Do et al.’s (2014) work in removing
permissions was a manual endeavor, it leads the way for the possibility of automating the process
in the future. The research is relevant to this paper because of the need for the potential curbing
of apps, possibly over-reaching in terms of privilege and a need to provide end-users some
possible control of their own digital environments.
Lastly, the application of sensor data, in addition to the regular usage of social media
applications, has been used extensively to research mental health issues (Saeb et al., 2015).
Using GPS/location data, usage statistics such as duration and features, and location variance
helped clinicians identify habits and early indicators of depression and other mental illness
issues. This type of research is important as it shows the positive application of user data to
benefit society as a whole; however, when used for marketing, the same positives can be turned
into negative, especially when the users are unaware of the collection and use of their data.
Summary
This chapter examined the broad range of subject matter associated with the problems of
social media data collection and end-user compliance. The literature includes research into the
software developers’ conversations regarding user privacy and what liberties users allow in
exchange for a social media provider’s service, issues with devices using stagnant data, and
software used to flag potential overreaching privileges in applications. The next chapter will
begin with the design of this paper’s research into what information the social contract between
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end-users and service providers details and what information is collected. The methodology of
the research to follow will help determine if there is a breach in the social contract.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
The first two research questions of this paper examine the data communications of
applications installed on a mobile device. The devices in this research are two cellular phones.
However, capturing cellular data is only possible from a cellular service provider or a law
enforcement agency. As such, the focus of the research was placed on the capture and analysis of
wireless data to and from the two mobile devices. An examination of the terms of service of each
of the five application being examined in this research was done to evaluate the intent and
purpose of the application in relation to how the application is used by the end-user, the access to
device resources such as sensors, accelerometers, global position systems, and system idle
processes.
The third research question of “Does performing a factory reset on a device removes
personal data artifacts?” is performed by capturing a forensic image of the systems storage
device to determine the contents of the device after being used by a user for a period of time and
then after a factory reset is completed.
Lastly, a survey of mobile device users was conducted to determine if the attitudes and
understanding of digital privacy and mobile apps coincides with the mobile app and social media
usage. Attitudes towards acceptance of third-party data sharing in exchange for entertainment or
usability were also measured to evaluate where the trade-off of privacy for service occurs.
Design of the Study
The research for this paper was done using a qualitative examination of mobile device
applications and transmissions to determine whether appropriate and relevant data was being
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accessed based on the permissions expected and granted by the end-user. To answer Research
Question 4, the devices were factory reset using the operating software settings and then imaged
to view existing file structures and device content. Finally, an additional quantitative, online
survey was performed to measure end-user attitude and understanding of mobile device
permissions and application privileges.
Data Collection
In order to accurately answer Research Questions 1 and 2, data from the two devices was
captured and analyzed in a controlled environment. The capture of the application and operating
system over Wi-Fi was performed using a specialty device called a Wi-Fi Pineapple. The devices
are marketed as a penetration testing device for performing man-in-the-middle attacks, advance
reconnaissance, and open-source intelligence gathering. The device was connected to a Dell G7,
Intel processor-based laptop via USB connection. Figure 4 diagrams the lab design. Data
transmitted from the mobile devices to the network was captured using the software application
Wireshark. The laptop computer was connected to the internet via an ethernet connection to an
Arris brand cable modem, which was a connection to the researcher’s ISP.

Figure 4. Research Lab Hardware Layout
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Because research is conducted in the researcher’s home location for several social media
accounts, an additional step of installing a VPN service was taken. The VPN service allows for
the originating location of the application data to appear to come from a different location. Data
collection was done with both VPN enabled and disabled to evaluate what, if any,
communication occurred differently when presenting from a different location.
To collect data in an as standardized state as possible, both mobile devices were factory
reset and configured with as near-identical settings as possible between the two different
operating systems. Both phones were joined to the research SSID (named research). From this
point on, each device was operated individually and never at the same time as the other to ensure
that data collection was clear on which device was sending and receiving data and what data was
being sent or received.
Social media applications used for the research include Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram,
LinkedIn, and MyFitnessPal. Except for Instagram being owned by Facebook, the other
applications have different parent companies. This is important since data from two different
applications from the same company may or may not be accessing different remote IPs. For
Research Question 4, “Does performing a ‘factory reset’ on a device remove personal data
artifacts?,” both devices were decommissioned from the research and the phones operating
systems functions were used to perform a ‘factory reset’ placing the devices in a “like new”
state. Before being decommissioned for reset, after being used for the duration of the research,
the devices were imaged to provide a capture of the state of their respective storage medium.
Upon the completion of the imaging, both forensic images were examined using Oxygen
Forensic Detective. No additional set up or configuration was done to the devices, and both
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devices were powered off until the forensic image was captured, after which the same software
was used to determine if any previous user data could be recovered from the device.
Tools and Techniques
The tools used in this research included two modern mobile devices from two of the most
prolific device vendors. The first device was a Samsung Galaxy S8 cellular/wireless phone. It
was running version 8.0 of the Android operating. The second device was an Apple iPhone 8
running version 13.3 of the iOS (see Figure 5). Both devices had the cellular service
disconnected, and all transmissions were monitored through the Wi-Fi adapter. Due to
limitations in collecting the cellular transmissions, we have decided to focus on the signals we
have more control over capturing without violating FCC laws.

Figure 5. Mobile Phone Configurations
All software not run from the mobile devices was run from a Dell G7 laptop running
Windows 10 Professional edition. Several device libraries were installed to ensure compatibility
between the mobile devices and forensic software. Wireshark used to capture network traffic
between the mobile device and the internet, was installed on the laptop. Additionally, an

37
application called Fiddler was installed to assist with capturing and analyzing any HTTP/HTTPS
protocol data traveling between the internet and the mobile devices as well.
To answer some of the questions proposed in this paper, the capture of data to and from
each device was necessary. Efforts were taken to ensure that the data being captured was only
from our specific devices. The network, as referenced in Figure 4 earlier in the paper, was used
and segmented from all other network and internet traffic. The two mobile devices were then
used individually on the research network to avoid any sort of crosstalk between devices. Each
device was started, joined to the research wireless access point then used in accordance with the
operation of the social media applications being tested. The Samsung S8 was the first device
used for testing. The android operating system connected to the research AP and promptly began
transmitting requests for software updates to several companies. This data was captured, and the
system was updated as needed before the testing of the social media applications began. Once the
system and network traffic were idle, the device was used to access the Google Play Store to
download and install the first social media application to be tested. Only one application was
tested at a time to make discerning which application was communicating with which remote
system during use clearer than if all applications were installed at the same time. The reason for
this extra step was because initial testing with multiple applications showed that all of the
applications sent and received data even when the application was not actively being used on the
device. That initial data was discarded but did provide some insight into the operation of the
applications during the devices’ idle state and prompted additional testing to be discussed later in
this section.
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Each social media application was used for a period of two hours and then allowed to be
idle for 24 hours with a follow-up use for another hour. Activities using the application include
standard usage, such as scrolling through the news/activity feed. “Like”-ing other people’s
postings and creating some posts. Testing avoided clicking on “sponsored” links and targeted
marketing links. At the conclusion of the active testing time, the application was “minimized” by
pressing the home button of the device, and the home screen was displayed until the device
turned off the screen based on the default setting of the operating system. The device was left to
idle for 24 hours. Idle was defined as no actively open applications, and the screen was off and
untouched for the entirety of the 24 hours. No user input or influence on the device during that
time.
Forensic images of the mobile device’s storage were done using several different
software applications. A post-usage capture of each device was performed using Oxygen
Forensic Detective to provide a deep level inspection of the storage medium. The same software
was used to compare the post-usage state to the factory-reset state to determine if any files could
be recovered post-wipe. Additional tools were employed to ensure due diligence in the research.
Using Android’s SDK, the Android storage system was examined and indexed. To examine the
Apple iOS, the software application iDevice Manager was used to index existing files and
explore application folders for user data.
The quantitative research was performed using a survey created for deployment to
college students in the Network Administration program at St. Cloud Technical and Community
College. Forty-six students participated in the online survey between the ages of 19 and 28 years
of age. The selection of college-age information technology students was decided upon for a
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couple of reasons. The first, IT students were expected to have a deeper understanding of
technology, data communications and basic security awareness. Secondly, most if not all these
students use multiple social media applications, so they are familiar with the use of the
applications in the research. The survey asked users to verify that they have experience using a
variety of mobile applications, including but not limited to the applications studied in this paper.
The questions looked for answers to how users felt about their trust in the way companies used
their data, the benefits of sharing their data, and their opinion on the cost of privacy in terms of
control over accessibility. The survey also evaluated the knowledge of users regarding the
privacy controls available to them.
Hardware and Software Environment
The research done in this study was performed, as indicated previously. The first device
will be a Samsung Galaxy S8 running the Android operating system version 8.0.0 with a kernel
version of 4.4.78. The second device will be an Apple iPhone version 8 running an operating
system version 13.3. These mobile devices were used to run applications and measure
application privileges, access, and transmission. In order to capture and process the information
from the mobile devices, this study incorporated a wireless access point designed to allow for the
capture of data transmissions related to the operation of the mobile devices. The Wi-Fi Pineapple
from Hak5 provided the research to be conducted by passing all wireless communication from
the mobile device through the access point, which then passed through the ethernet adapter on
the laptop computer to be captured and processed before being sent along to the internet. All
returning data is passed back through the same route. Examination of the data transmissions was
captured using the WireShark application on a Dell G7 laptop computer running the most current
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version of Windows 10. A forensic examination of the mobile device was done at the end of the
permissions tests to capture the state of the systems, including files and metadata captured during
the use of the devices. This information will be cataloged, and the systems will then be “factory
reset.” After each device is reset, the same forensic examination was done to determine if the
factory reset left any personal data behind. The examination of the storage media was done using
two methods of examination.
Summary
The process of collecting forensic data from a mobile device has substantial challenges.
With current encryption standards and system sandboxing, methods system files and nonapplication data can be difficult to extract from the devices. Federal restrictions on monitoring
cellular data also limit data collection methods. However, mobile devices still provide complete
data communication through the IEEE wireless standard 802.11 and its extensions. We were able
to capture data as it is passed from the device through an access point and passed along to a
wired connection. This chapter laid out the methodology of the research to provide an
understanding of how the data would travel from the mobile device through the collection
computer and on to the internet. Software running on the workstation would provide a glimpse
into the sources and destinations of communications from each of the applications. The next
chapter will explore the data that was collected and what it means in relation to each of the
research questions posed in this research document.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
The research questions proposed at the beginning of this paper laid forth three major
sections of data collection and analysis. The first, an examination of the privacy policies of five
different social media applications. These policies were examined for expected protections and
access to various device resources such as cameras, storage, and location information. This
information was then compared to the information that was sent to the applications various URLs
and IP addresses to determine if the applications were abiding by not only the data collected but
to whom the data was sent. In addition, data was examined to determine if the applications were
sending data that did not coincide with the purpose or needs of the application. The third
research question addresses what happens to all of the data that applications store on the device
itself. This chapter will explore the storage medium of the mobile devices before and after a user
has operated the devices for a period of time. Pre-usage, post usage, and post factory reset status
of the devices’ digital storage will be analyzed. The last research question will provide insight to
what end-users value in regard to digital privacy and examine the willingness to exchange
various levels of privacy for convenience or entertainment.
According to research done by Zang, Dummit, Graves, Lisker, and Sweeney (2015),
there are several ways to examine the privileges and permissions requested by mobile device
applications. The first is permissions analysis, where the terms and policies of each company are
viewed and compared. The second approach is static code analysis, which involves the
decompiling of an application. While effective requires several tools unavailable to this author.
Lastly, the dynamic analysis of an application captures what is happening while an application is
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being used (Zang et al., 2015). This paper used the first and third methods suggested by Zang et
al. to evaluate the research questions and determine if the applications are abusing the trust and
expectations of the users to collect and profit from their personal information.
Data Presentation
In today’s social media and mobile device environment, the installation of an application
by an end-user typically involves that user clicks on a checkbox or button indicating that they are
agreeing to both the Terms of Service and the Privacy Policy of whichever company is providing
the application. However, very few people spend more than a moments glance at the actual terms
presented, and those documents are often considered too difficult to understand or too obscure to
evaluate by many users (Mcdonald & Cranor, 2008).
The United States has no fewer than eight federal or state laws dictating that any
company collecting information that can be used to identify a person must include a Privacy
Policy (TermsFeed, 2020). These pieces of information include, but are not limited to birthdates,
first and land names, billing addresses, and email addresses. Personally Identifiable Information
(PII), in the United States, is regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and some states
are taking action to create more transparency between the policies, companies, and end-users.
Starting January 1, for example, the state of California implemented the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) to require businesses that reach California residents to provide them with a
Privacy Policy to promote transparency and to provide end-users with more control of their
personal information and how it is used. For the purposes of this research paper, we will explore
the Privacy Policies of the five applications used to explore the research questions. Those five
applications are Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, and MyFitnessPal.
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The following section will summarize the policies of each of the applications to provide a
baseline of what should be expected by using each application in regard to the user’s personal
information.
Facebook
Facebook’s Data Policy (Facebook, 2020) lays out the details of the information they
collect and how they use that information. Basically, any data the user enters or accesses while
using the application are a fair game for Facebook to access. This includes “Things you and
others do and provide,” which means that from the time you create an account to the moment
you shut down the application, Facebook can use your information. It also means that Facebook
can use anything that anyone you interact with, enters into the application as well. “Our systems
automatically process content and communications you and others provide to analyze context
and what’s in them” (Facebook, 2020). If you share something and someone likes that post, you
are now linked to that person and are creating a network of people, preferences, and connections
that Facebook will use in a variety of ways, which will be discussed later in this section. A major
focus of this paper is the information not provided by the end-user but rather by the end-user
device. Facebook Data Policy (Facebook, 2020) contains a section addressing what information
the company collects. This includes computers, phones, connected TVs, and any internetconnected device that uses a product provided by the Facebook company. The information that
the policy says they collect includes Device attributes such as operating system, hardware and
software versions, battery levels, signal strength, and file names. Additionally, the policy lists
device operations, device signals, and settings and network connections. In the Device operations
section, Facebook mentions the collection of foreground and background useable of the
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application, mouse movements. However, there is no mention of other specific sensor data
collection. An important aspect of this research includes the use of sensor data associated with
the use of the application our research will address this issue later in the paper. GPS information,
signal information, including Wi-Fi access points and cellular towers accessed by the device, are
also collected and fair game for Facebook to use. Included in that information is your mobile
device phone number as well as “other devices that are nearby or on your network” (Facebook,
2020). All this information is fair game for Facebook to use to identify, target, and influence
users.
In addition to the information that Facebook collects directly from its application,
Website, and its users, they also collect information from any app developer who uses
Facebook’s social plug-in such as the Like button, or if an app allows users to create
accounts/log in using their Facebook account. All of these things allow Facebook to track, link
any consolidate users’ actions and activities to develop a robust profile of the user. Lastly,
Facebook has a program called Facebook Pixel which allows web developers to add a single
transparent pixel to their websites that allow Facebook with “data about what millions of people
read, shop for, and watch online as they move around the web.” (John, 2018). If you have ever
left an item in the online shopping cart of a website only to see an ad for that or a similar item on
Facebook, that is what Pixel is doing.
Instagram
In 2012, Instagram was purchased by Facebook and presented users with a notice
indicating that they, the users, would still have control over who views what they share.
However, while the end-user can control who can see the images they post to the application and
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site, they still are bound by Facebook’s terms and privacy policy. So anything not covered
directly by Instagram’s policies are still covered by Facebook’s policies. Instagram does directly
mention that they “When you use a mobile device like a tablet or phone to access our Service,
we may access, collect, monitor, store on your device, and/or remotely store one or more ‘device
identifiers’ “(Instagram, 2017). The modern image capturing devices, like mobile phones,
include a great deal of information when taking a picture or screenshot. This information is
called Metadata and, in its raw format, provides information such as GPS location, time and date
information, and device settings. If users are unaware of this information, they could potentially
expose personal information to the public. This information can have global implications. For
example, a Russian soldier posted selfies while in Ukraine. Despite the fact that no Russian
soldier should have been in the area or the country at the time. The Russian military denied the
soldier was ever in the location; however, the metadata from the image posted shows information
counter to that claim (Gallagher, 2014). Instagram, however, does not enable this option by
default, and examination of images uploaded with default app configurations do not provide
metadata. While Instagram may scrub such information when a user posts to their site, it does
still get transmitted to Instagram for their use. Figure 6 below shows the same image in its raw
format and then after being posted to Instagram and downloaded for examination.
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Figure 6. EXFIL/Metadata Results of Original Versus Instagram Posted Image (Pic2Map, 2020)
Notice that the original image on the left contains metadata, including the longitude and
latitude of where the image was taken while the second image has that information removed. The
policy is fairly light on how the application uses the data, and that is partially due to the fact that
they are owned by Facebook and fall under their policy umbrella, but it does address a few things
directly. Instagram uses user data to “provide personalized content and information” as well as
“monitor metrics” for visitor counts and site usage. Noticeably absent from the privacy policy is
any mention of device information short of the device identifier data that is stored.
Snapchat
Snapchat is similar in service to Instagram. The parent company of Snapchat is Snap Inc.
They provide a lengthy privacy policy similar to the other companies, but they also provide a
link to a toned-down, easier to read policy summary titled “Your Privacy, Explained” which
leaves out the technical details and states that it is “blissfully free of the legalese that often
clouds these documents” (Snap Inc., 2019).
In a similar fashion, Snapchat collects the information you provide, such as user profile
information, as well as information collected when you use the service. Information collected
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when using the service includes EXFIL information (metadata) from images as well as any
text/emoticons used and any picture “lenses,” which apply cute, silly, or unusual overlays to the
pictures taken. These lenses can be geofenced to allow advertisers to create custom and
temporary lenses people can use to promote an event or product with a Snapchat image posting.
These advertisers become one of the many “partners” social media company mentions in their
privacy notices. Snap Inc. defines usage information as any time you interact with the
application, including but not limited to snaps and chats with other users, exchanged messages,
and when you open a message or view someone else’s snaps. They are also clear that they vie
wall metadata of images provided to the service. Lastly, about Snapchat, they are the clearest
about the collection of device sensor data, “such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, compasses,
microphones, and whether you have headphones connected” (Snap Inc., 2019). Much of the
information listed in Snap Inc.’s privacy policy is clear as they outright state that they will use
your GPS, wireless, and cellular locations and that they have access to your images.
LinkedIn
As with the previous applications and services, the LinkedIn Privacy policy highlights
what we’ve come to expect. However, LinkedIn is the first to provide a link to address
California’s specific consumer privacy law CCPA (California Consumer Privacy Act), where it
clearly states several times that “We do not sell personal information” (California Privacy
Disclosure/LinkedIn, 2020). In addition, through the online Policy Agreement, LinkedIn includes
links to the settings that allow users to opt-in or out of certain data collection options such as the
tracking of visits to other websites even when not logged into LinkedIn and additional crosswebsite tracking as seen in Figure 7 below.
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Figure. 7. LinkedIn Data Privacy Opt-Out Settings (Facebook, 2020).
One interesting take away from the examination of the opt-out options is that several of
the settings are very similar in stated purpose and by failing to opt-out of all of them, you
essentially open yourself to the same accessibility of data as you would if you had not opted out
of any of them. LinkedIn has the most robust and customizable data sharing settings of any of the
applications researched in this paper with specific pieces of data having the option of whether or
not to be shared, such as Salary, Search history, Connections, and even some third-party data.
Given its professional nature, and less of an entertainment social media, the ability to share and
define what others see is paramount to the brand; however data about user usage of the service is
still highly collected and used for advertising revenue and marketing partnerships.
MyFitnessPal
MyFitnessPal is a health and wellness application that is owned by the Athletic apparel
company Under Armour. As a result of being a part of a multifaceted company not solely built
around social media, the privacy policy for the application is a bit more difficult to read through.
One section that could use a legal expert to interpret is the section of “Does Under Armour
“Sell” my personal data?” to which the companies written response is that they do not exchange
user’s data for money, rather they provide sed information to other companies for advertising
purposes. Basically, stating that they do give your information to third parties so they can target
advertisements to users, for which Under Armour is compensated. This research is not novel and
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is not the point of this paper but the notion that all these companies use terminology similar to
this to justify taking user data and, in effect, selling it to third parties to use drive to the heart of
what concerns end-users when the topic privacy in social media arises. As for the MyFitnessPal
app, the website containing the Privacy Policy is difficult to navigate with each section of the
policy linked to a different web page. However, one of the first items listed indicates that free
version of the software collects and keeps data for two years. This data is only accessible to the
end-user for two years, though, the company makes no claim as to how long it holds on to the
data. Premium members could go back farther in their data, exposing a potential longer-term
storage capability. Regarding this paper’s research specifically, the policy does state that it uses
GPS location and network location information. MFP also stated that they “collect or infer such
data from mobile device sensors,” including mobile phones or computing devices but also heart
rate sensors, fitness trackers, and other interconnected devices. This seems logical given the
nature of the application as a Health and Wellness app and would seem reasonable to the average
person until you consider that the data collected by those devices could be provided to health
insurers or medical facilities without user knowledge. Nowhere in their terms of service does it
explicitly indicate that they do not share that information with those types of entities. The
privacy policy links to an Under Armour listing defining the various types of companies they
share information with, a listing that is 13 different vendors in length. This is the only company
that so clearly lists the advertising and social media business partners. The amount of data
available to them in the form of health and fitness trackers is, however, must more personal and
private in nature to most uses.
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Summary of Privacy Policy Review
Much of what was identified in one service privacy policy was also seen in the others. All
the companies were very clear in that they provide user data to “partners” with whom they do
business with. Companies who advertise using the services application to reach customers are
provided the most access. Additionally, those companies who also utilize the social media
services to track activity from their website back to Facebook, for example, have access to the
widest range of user’s data to allow for the most specific targeting marketing campaigns. Based
on the research done for this paper, the social media service user data also includes any mobile
device sensor data collected by the application. The applications initially prompt a user for
access to common sensors such as the camera, microphone, call activity, and messaging and
users do have the opportunity, through the operating systems of the mobile devices to disable
access to various system resources. However, limiting access to things like the camera or
microphone of an image capture social media applications like Snapchat or Instagram defeats the
purpose of the application. As expected the privacy policies of these applications are clear
enough to give a person the impression they are protected and that the user’s data is not going
anywhere except to the social medial applications company and its associates and still leave
room for legal loopholes that allow the company to do what they like with the data. Based on the
polices viewed in this research, end-users have some control of the information in a stored state
on the service providers’ servers. Table 3 shows a summary of user control in the five social
media apps and Figure 8 lists whether or not a user has the ability to control or request the
information that a provider has collected on the user of the use of the application.
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Table 3
Summary of User Control in the Five Social Media Apps.
Users Can Request
All Data

Specify Third-Party
Data Partners

Third-Party Data
Limitations

Uses Can Delete
Account and Data

Facebook

Yes

No

No

Yes

Instagram

Yes

No

No

Yes

Snapchat

Yes

No

No

Yes

LinkedIn

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

MyFitnessPal

Yes

No

No

Yes

Figure 8. Example of Data Destination IP Addresses.
In all of the social media applications examined, similar terms were used to label
personal data. Words like trackers, fingerprints, and footprints are all terms used to encompass
personal data and identity tracking across social media platforms and advertising markets. Once
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again providing evidence that the policies are intended to be easy to read across companies any
yet vague enough to lead consumers to gloss over the true meaning.
Device Usage
During the testing, each device was provided a full battery charge to ensure that the
device did not shut down or go into any low-power mode during the tests. The usage of the
device proceeded, as indicated in the methodology portion of the paper. During the time of
testing, all network transmissions were collected using a man-in-the-middle process. Packet
captures were analyzed to discern the source and destination IP address of communications
during use. While this shows us where the application and the device are connecting to, the
encryption inherent in today’s applications and secure communication protocols makes it nearly
impossible to determine what the content of those messages is. Dynamic analysis of the
applications used in this research provided a lot of connections to various servers; however, the
widely adopted use of cloud computing resources made identifying individual advertising or
third-party data destinations very difficult. While using each application, it was clear that data
was going to three major IP address blocks, with each app sending additional data to multiple
other sites but with much less frequency. For example, while using Facebook, IP addresses
associated with Facebook Inc. were the destination of most of the communication. However,
examining the addresses not associated with Facebook, we can see that a large segment of the
communication was to Google and the Google cloud services hosts and Amazon servers and the
AWS environment. Figure 9 does not reflect the 15 Amazon AWS IP associations but does show
a truncated listing of the 68 unduplicated destinations.
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During the operation of each of the social media applications, the results were similar.
The bulk of the communication, as expected, was to the applications parent company. However,
there were substantial transmissions from applications during times when the devices were idle.
Idle time for the devices meant that no application had priority over the device, and the system
was either displaying the home screen, or the screen was off. The default settings for most
applications is to allow for background data transmission to allow the device to provide user
notifications. During testing, this setting was configured both ways to evaluate if the number of
transmissions was impacted. The results of the five applications indicated that the changing of
this setting had little impact on the communication of the application. When analyzing this data,
it was discovered that most of the traffic was from the device operating system. For example, on
the Apple device, most idle traffic was traced to itunes.apple.com, www.icloud.com, and
cl5.apple.com. By filtering out those records, we can see that the devices were still busy sending
data while idle, as Figure 9 shows.

Figure 9. Idle System Application Transmission Levels.
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Sensor Data
Our devices are not just palm-sized computers displaying information in a static
environment. Modern mobile devices contain several sensors that provide a wide variety of
information about the environment and use of the device to provide detailed interaction with
applications and services (Mehrnezhad & Toreini, 2019). Each of our devices tested contained
sensors that provided data about everything from ambient light altitude, orientation, motion as
well as audio and video inputs. Except for location (GPS) and audio/video sensors, most users
are not keenly aware of the role, and impact sensors have on their interaction with modern
mobile devices. To discern if applications were collecting and using this data, the two devices
were connected to their respective software development kits to monitor changes in sensor status
while using the applications. According to Android Developers, there are 13 different sensors
that a device may have. The type and purpose of each sensor can be viewed in Table 5 in
Appendix A of this paper. Reviewing the technical specifications of the two devices in this
research, we see that the Samsung device has more sensors than the Apple device does, as
indicated in Table 4 below.
Table 4
Sensors by Device
Samsung S8
Accelerometer
Barometer
Fingerprint Scanner
Iris scanner
Gyroscope
Hall Sensor
Proximity Sensor

Apple iPhone 8
Touch ID Fingerprint Sensor
Barometer
Three-Axiz Gyro
Accelerometer
Ambient Light Sensor
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Since the privacy policies of all the social media applications admit to collecting device
data, it was decided to focus on the frequency of sensor access the applications were using and
try to determine what sensor data is being transmitted. Unfortunately, without the ability to
decompile the applications, it is impossible to know exactly what and when the app accesses
sensor data. As a result, a kind of workaround was set up to view both sensor logs from the
device as well as capture network transmissions. The Samsung device was connected to the
computer using a USB-C to USB-A cable and attached to the Android SDK software. Device
Logging was enabled and monitored to see when sensors were actively reporting data. Next,
Wireshark was started to collect all network traffic from the mobile device, and the social media
application was started.

Figure 10. Android Log Displaying Sensor Activity
Additional research indicates that even though each sensor has a specific purpose, those
sensors have the ability to do more than users or even developers intend. One such example is
the patent for a system that allows the accelerometer to detect a user’s voice activity. These kinds
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of developments pave the way for companies to obscure what type of access they have to user’s
information. Researches developed an application capable of using the gyroscope sensors as a
crude microphone allowing for the application to pick up conversations (Greenberg, 2014).
However, this paper’s research is not about the multitude of threats from third-part applications
but the common and more trusted social medial applications. Data collected in the research of
Question 3 provides a correlation of sensor readings and application data transmissions. Each
time an application was started, a sensor reading of phone orientation was captured. This is a
reasonable step to orient the display in a manner consistent with how the user is holding the
device. Other tests included using the device to post an image, checking into a location, and
taking a “selfie.” From examining the two sources of information, it was clear that the
application used the sensor data in a manner consistent with the operation of the software. Figure
11 attempts to show the time and process correlation of the log data next to the network data.

Figure 11. Data Correlation Between Device Log and Network Traffic
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That is not to say there are not applications out there taking advantage of this hidden data. There
are numerous reports and research indicating that creative developers and less scrupulous
companies can potentially take advantage of sensor data and device permissions to collect
additional information about their users.
One additional interesting observation was, while the iPhone was connected to the
research network, the connected clients were being monitored to ensure that no unwanted
devices appeared in the stream of data. Even though it had not been explicitly allowed to connect
to the research network, an Apple watch associated to the iPhone via Bluetooth automatically
connected and appeared in the connected clients list. The act of a device joining a wireless access
point simply because another device it is paired to is a dangerous practice. This is another
example of the devices do things that the typical end-users are completely unaware of and could
lead to an erosion of user security.
Storage Utilization
Mobile devices are designed to store and transmit data. Each device handles the storage
of user data differently and has different storage options. For example, a device typically has
non-removable internal storage. A device might also have a removable SD/MicroSD card to
increase storage capacity. Research Question 3 asks if the data from typical usage by an enduser is removed during the processes involved in a “factory reset.” Neither of the devices used
for this research contained additional storage in the form of an SD card, so all testing was done
on the internal storage medium of each device. Both devices report having a 64 GB internal
drive. After the initial factory reset of each device and before any non-system or non-service
provider applications were installed, the devices operating system reported that approximately
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15.4 GB of storage space was used. Examination of the file hierarchy indicated that there were
6,612 directories and over 567,411 files on the “clean” Samsung device. These counts are all
taken before the operating system of the device could update the software or any pre-installed
applications. During testing, there were five applications installed and operated in a standard user
expected fashion. Social media sites were visited, postings were made and viewed, pictures were
taken and uploaded. Upon completion of the research into application permissions and sensor
data collection, the devices were once again connected to the forensics software to create another
disk image. Usage of the five social media applications created an additional 516MB of files on
the Samsung device’s internal storage and 473MB of data on the iOS device. The examination of
the images produced little of interest. Files discovered include cached files from social media
usage and other data that would be useful if we were performing an investigation of user
activities but not enough to examine post “factory reset.”
Both devices were once again reset using the settings within the operating system. A
final, post-wipe image was captured, and attempts were made to discover any remaining data. As
expected and previous research indicates, the file structure is destroyed and rebuilt. Since all of
the data on the device is encrypted, the reset destroys the keys associated with the encryption
process, so even if we were able to identify data at the bit level, the encryption process and
destruction of the keys has made it impossible to access the data. A quote from Apple’s support
pages states, “The “Erase all content and settings” option in Settings obliterates all the keys in
Effaceable Storage, rendering all user data on the device cryptographically inaccessible” (Apple
Support, 2020).
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End-user Survey
The final part of this paper’s research was to conduct an end-user survey of perceptions
of privacy both before and after exposure to how the social media applications access, process,
and utilize personal data. The initial survey was given to 46 college students in the Central
Minnesota area to evaluate the students’ opinions on privacy and to measure the change in
responses after providing additional information on the subject matter. The survey was based on
five observations of the research. The first being that even when idle, the device continued to
transmit data not related to the operation of the applications. Second, companies now use tracker
IDs as a way to obscure users’ personal identity from third parties, but the use of these trackers
across devices and applications allows for highly detailed profiles to be created, making the
identification of users rather simple. Third, privacy policies are written as to appear simple and
straight forward; however, they allow of substantial leeway and loopholes for companies to
maintain control of user’s data. Fourth, most of the data transmitted while actively using a social
media application go to servers hosted by that company. There are still significant packets that
travel to third-party advertising affiliate sites that collect data in association with the application
vendor. Lastly, permissions requested by applications to user data provide much more access to
personal information than users have been led to believe. Survey takers were presented with ten
questions, and the results were evaluated to determine the level of user concern regarding their
personal data, how it is accessed, and the access of social media applications. Questions were
posed to measure the user’s awareness of the corporate use of their data and assess their
acceptance of that usage. Based on the results, the research also intended to discover opinions on
the tradeoff of convenience or entertainment in exchange for access to their personal data.
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Table 5 (see Appendix A) shows the results of the survey asking which social media
applications used in this paper’s research were used. 100% of the users used the Facebook
application. 64.52% of respondents also used Instagram, which is owned by Facebook and falls
largely under the same privacy policies. Survey takers indicated that 41.94% used MyFitnessPal,
which was interesting in the fact that the UnderArmour corporation is the most open to sharing
and selling of user data and that fitness tracking applications collect the most personal health
information of all the applications.

Figure 12. Survey Results: App Usage
When asked if users felt that the privacy policies provided adequate protection against a
company using personal data against their wishes, 19.35% of respondents indicated “yes.” The
overwhelming balance is indicating that they did not believe that the privacy policies protected
them. As our research indicated earlier, there are virtually no federal regulations on safeguarding
consumer digital privacy in the United States. If this research had been conducted in some other
countries, we might see different results given the implementation of GDRP (General Data
Protection Regulation) enacted in May of 2018. “The GDPR puts digital consent, privacy, and
control front and center” (Stewart, 2018). When asked to rate several statements about user
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privacy and protections, 38.71% of users responded that they felt “neutral” about whether social
media companies were concerned about user data privacy. An equal amount fell into the
Disagree to Strongly Disagree range, with only 22.58% felt that the companies were interested in
consumer protections. Interestingly, 29.04% of survey takers also responded that they did not
have any data they felt required protections and so were comfortable with the social media
applications using their data. Observations on this dichotomy will be discussed later in this
document.
When asked if a company should be financially penalized for data breaches or data
misuse of user data, a majority (83.87%) indicated they strongly agreed. The sentiment
indicating that even though many users do not feel that their data is really in need of protection
or important enough to be concerned with how a company might use it, they still feel that a
company should be penalized if that data is accessed unlawfully.
Users were asked to share what data they felt was acceptable for a social media
application to share with its partners and advertisers. Many uses opted to indicate that none of
their data is acceptable; however, the majority indicated that any information a user enters into
their profile if the fair game for the company to utilize. Figure 13 shows the breakdown with
only one user, indicating that just about any data is acceptable. If we were to drop this user from
the survey, a clear line emerges that anything within the application is suitable, but other files
such as files saved on their device or contacts not part of the application should be more
protected from access.
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Figure 13: Survey Results: Acceptably Shareable User Data
Currently, most of the data that is collected by social media is provided through the
standard use of the applications. However, as experienced in our testing, new users are prompted
several times during the installation and setup of user accounts to allow the application to access
user contacts stored in the device in order to make connections with other users of the
application/service who might already have an account. Other access requests include access to
stored images to allow a user to upload a profile picture. However, granting access to the stored
images allows for much greater access to data than the user is typically aware of. Most service
providers view this granting of permission as an Opt-In of the user agreeing to allow ongoing
access to data stored on the device. This survey asked the users if there should be more clear optin procedures to protect user data, and 87% responded “yes.”
Lastly, after explaining what data companies have access to and how users are tracked
across applications and devices, users were asked one last question. If all the data listed in the
question about sharing acceptability was collected by the application’s company, “Would you
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still use it?” Even with the knowledge that the application collects all the data listed, including
information not used in the application, 58.6% of users still said they would use the application.

Figure 14. Apps Usage with Full Access to User Data
Observations
The research began by evaluating the public privacy policies of each of the applications.
While all the policies were easy to read and described in very straightforward terms what, and
how they used user data, they were very vague in specific access methodologies. Almost all the
applications list “business partners” as those who use the service to target and reach a specific
audience. Individual companies do not have to include tracking data collection outside of the
primary application. In other words, companies do not have to have their own servers to collect
data across the internet. It is all provided by the host application. User interactions with online
advertisements still initiate additional data on the network, but ad viewer count and exposures
are still captured within the applications. While the data is not “sold,” it is provided to companies
who “partner” with the host application. A partnership that costs money to maintain. The use of
the term “sold” is clearly defined differently between end-users and service providers.
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During the collection of network traffic, devices sat idle for 24 hours between usage. This
allowed us to capture transmissions from applications even when the user was not operating the
device. Much of the data collected was related to the operation of the devices operating system;
however, regular transmissions to vendor-specific domains indicated that the application was
pinging the servers. Limitations to accessing the payload of the images due to encryption
prevented deeper analysis, but the fact that even when idle the application is reaching out to the
servers indicates that the device is not as inactive as a user might believe.
Kerry (2018) made an astute observation about the current state of digital privacy, and
the challenges of keeping track of and control of the vast amounts of information users are
producing. “It’s a losing game both for individuals and for our legal system” (Kerry, 2018).
During traffic analysis, about three dozen non-service-related IP ranges were identified as
receiving or sending traffic while using the various applications. The use of tracker files and
profile analysis by social media companies allow for much of the user data transactions to take
place within the data centers run by the various companies. Additionally, the rise of cloud
computing for many companies makes identification of various domains much more challenging
as blocks of IP address can be assigned to a company, but the global WHOIS databases only
register the host, which is often Amazon (AWS) or Google Cloud services. Because of the
massive amount of data created and accessed very minute of every day, it’s easy to see how
much of a challenge state and federal governments will have if data privacy becomes a greater
issue in the future.
The final observation during this research was the extent of access that applications
request when they are first installed and how little the average user understands about those
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permissions. As stated earlier in the paper, when providing app access to your photos for the sake
of posting images to a social media site, you are allowing that vendor full access to all of the data
each photo. This includes the EXFIL data, such as location the picture was taken and when. And
while this information is stripped out by the company before the image is posted, there is no
policy or law that dictates what a company may or may not do with that data. Sensor data
collection is limited only to what the application programmers want to collect. Simple gyroscope
sensors allow the app to determine if it should display in landscape or portrait mode, but
accelerometers can measure speed, estimate mode of travel, and, along with GPS sensors,
provide a precise app location and travel details. All of which users are readily providing
insurance companies in exchange for potentially lower rates or rebates (Shilton & Green, 2019).
To measure the knowledge and comfort level of users in regard to their privacy online,
the survey was given to 32 college students as a graded assignment. The small sampling size and
focused group of students used to collect the information made it clear that IT students have a
keener view of privacy than many end-users. The students are taking the survey information
technology students, some of which were specializing in cybersecurity. Even with the knowledge
of how data is collected and used, the majority still stated they would continue to use social
media applications. In conversations with some of the students, the question of “why still use the
app?” was asked. The responses indicated that they didn’t mind the targeted apps, or they used
ad blocking software, so they really didn’t see the effects of the data collection. This thinking
provides another glimpse into the average user as we are overwhelmed by advertising is all of its
various forms to the point that targeted ads just provide us with things that might be more
interesting than general ads for things we might never use.
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Summary
This chapter covered the majority of our research, including live app and idle system data
transmission collection, device sensor usage by the applications, and transmissions to servers
other than those operated by the social media service providers. Thanks to the continued
development of encryption standards and whole device encryption being more commonplace in
mobile devices, access to user data post-factory resets is virtually impossible in more modern
devices. Survey results show us that even though users are uncomfortable with the level of
access applications have to their data; they are still willing to freely exchange that data for
convenience or reward.
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Future Work
Introduction
Over the course of this research, several different areas of privacy have been examined,
from the policies and promises of social media companies to the data transmissions from devices
to servers. At every step of the research, there have been subtle deviations from the expected
operation of social media applications. Little pieces of information that lead to an overall
conclusion. This section will review the results of the data collection, the system resets, and
survey results. The conclusions of which will provide insight into what is the current status of
digital privacy and digital privacy literacy and what recommendations can be made for future
users.
Results
This research was intended to provide some insight into the type and frequency of data
collected by social media applications during the regular and expected use of the software and to
test whether or not data created by end-users would be persistent on the device even after the use
of a factory reset typically used to clear a device back to an “out of box” state. Based on those
observations, a survey was created to measure what end-users’ positions were in regard to
privacy prior to, and then after, being enlightened to the results of the research. During the
research, four questions were asked to discover if our data is being collected or used outside of
the bounds laid out in user agreements and privacy policies.
The first research question was whether social media applications are collecting data
unrelated to the functionality of the app? To answer this question, new devices were deployed
with no prior user data, and new accounts were created. Each tested application was run on both

68
an Android and Apple device, and each application could run as the only installed application.
Data captured indicated that the majority of the data being sent and received by the device was
related to the application; however there were enough packets sent to domains outside of the
application vendor to question what the third party might be collecting additional information.
Attempts were made to examine packet payloads, but encryption obfuscated the data, so only
source and destination information was accessible. Attempted man-in-the-middle access resulted
in most applications refusing to connect to their hosts. Despite the limitations of deep packet
inspection, it was noticed that data, unrelated to the user’s operation of the application, did occur
as regular data transmissions were sent while the device was idle. While this idle data transfer is
likely tied to end-user notification capabilities in the application, end-users awareness of such
exchanges is rather limited.
The second research question is bound to the first question. What data is transmitted to
and from a device once the application is installed? The research into the payloads of data
transmissions was limited by current encryption standards, but other information could be
correlated to produce some results. In addition to the data collection, sensor data was observed
using software APKs while using the applications. Logs of the data transmissions coordinated
with the packet captures indicate that sensor data is transmitted to the application vendor. As
indicated in the existing literature, sensor data usage by applications has been known to be an
issue for years; it is still an unresolved problem given the users’ desire for ease of use and a
willingness to allow it despite the security implications.
According to the privacy policies of the five applications tested in this research, only one
failed to outright state that they do not sell user data. The four that made such claims protected
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themselves by stating that user data is only provided to “business partners” to provide better or
more focused user interactions. It’s this kind of legal speak that lulls average users into a false
sense of security about what they share online. While the wording is mundane, it leaves much
room for interpretation. As this paper’s research showed, providing access to the images stored
on a user’s device gives the companies access to so much more information. Facebook does not
have any specific details about the EXIF information it collects, and while the data is removed
when an image is posted, the data is still collected by Facebook and used in unknown ways
(James, 2011). Once again, end-users do not receive a full understanding of what providing
access to certain device sensors or software directories really means and, as a result, open
themselves to all matter of personal privacy abuses.
The third research question of; “Does performing a factory reset on a device remove
personal data artifacts?” For this part of the research, the two devices that were used for the
previous data usage testing were both imaged using Oxygen Forensic Examiner software. Before
testing and creating user profiles for any of the applications, a forensic image was created of the
device. After testing, the devices were images a second time. An examination of the social media
applications provided some interesting data in the forensic software, but data stored on the
device still used by an end-user was outside of the scope of this research. A factory reset of each
device was then performed, and the data in the images was examined. On the Android phone,
there were several image files created by using the device’s camera to upload to Facebook, and
Instagram were still recoverable. A couple of system logs retained some data post-reset as well.
However, with the Apple device, the images were compared, and only system files were
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recognizably recoverable. Apple’s tight control of the operating system and app environment
allow for cleaner system wipes.
The final question: “What is the perception from the end user’s perspective of the
exchanging personal information, and thus sacrificing digital privacy, in exchange for
entertainment/social interaction?” the survey polled 40 college students ranging between 20 and
30 years of age. The results of which indicate that even though they know that data provided
while using the applications is provided to an unknown number of business affiliates, they would
still use the app. In addition, the lack of knowledge of how much access permissions really give
an app, such as access to images, leaves users vulnerable to privacy abuses. The lack of
transparency in the overall reach of privileges and a lack of user knowledge in what they agree to
when creating an account with a social media app is what allows companies to abscond with user
data unquestioned. Unfortunately, even when users are aware of the misdeeds, they refuse to
give up their social media applications. The convenience and entertainment value is more
important than privacy for the vast majority of people.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this research has provided a look into the flow of information from mobile
devices to the application servers in such a way as to determine if our data is true to the usage
intended by installing and running social media applications. Through the use of packet captured
data in a controlled environment, the research shows that not all of the data being sent is dose so
through user interactions. Idle communication is taking place on a regular basis providing the
applications and the device operating system additional information about the user. The use of
factory reset on a device has mixed results with a more controlled environment such as Apple’s
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iOS providing better end-user protections when wiping their device. Lastly, user understanding
of the data processed by today’s mobile devices is insufficient to effectively protect users from
manipulation by companies with access to the vast amount of data. Modern profile tracking
technology far exceeds users’ concern for privacy, especially when it comes in conflict with their
desire for entertainment.
Future Work
Digital privacy, especially regarding mobile devices, personal freedoms, and government
overreach/censorship, is a major concern in the world today. As more people become untethered
by desktop or even laptop computers, the importance of having privacy and control of personal
data will be ever-present. Demands for transparency and accountability will continue to expand
as users slowly become more aware of the methods and processes used by social media
companies to make a profit from sharing user information. The abuse of information, such as that
of Cambridge Analytica, is just the beginning of what will happen if users continue to hide their
heads in the sand for fear of losing some level of convenience or entertainment.
The United States continues to drag their feet when dealing with personal data protection.
Some states are making progress, like the European Union, but the corporations have virtually
unfettered access and use of our information. Future research on the processes used to create and
track users across sites, devices, and companies might open opportunities for user education.
More educated users will produce more secure users, especially if they are provided more
granular control over their digital environment and the data that they share. The idea of “virtual
walls” where users have more control over their digital footprint has a potentially positive impact
on user privacy.
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Appendix B: Research Survey Questions
Data Privacy and Personal Information Survey
PAGE 1:
Social media apps provide us with many ways to interact with each other. They also collect a lot of data
about what we like, who we interact with and where we go. The following questions will measure your
comfort with the current way apps use our data.
Q1: Which of the following mobile apps do you use? Check any or all that you use.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Facebook
Instagram
Snapchat
LinkedIn
MyFitnessPal/Other health or fitness app
Twitter

Q2: Do you believe the privacy policy that companies provide protect your personal information from
unwanted collection by other companies?
•
•

Yes
No

Q3: Do you feel that social media apps provide adequate ways for you to control access to your data?
•
•

Yes
No

Q4: Do you believe that access to your information is a fair exchange for a free service? (i.e. Facebook or
Instagram)
•
•

Yes
No

Q5: Please rate the following statements:
Scale: Strongly Agree……Agree……Neutral……Disagree……Strongly Disagree
•
•
•
•

I believe social media apps are concerned about my privacy.
I have nothing to hide so it does not matter if they use my data.
I would exchange my information for a discount on goods or services.
A company that misuses or loses my data to a breach should be financially penalized.
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PAGE 2:
Data Privacy Survey - Part 2
It has been proven that social media companies track users across devices and even applications. Your
mobile devices collect location information in various ways and your images all have location
information stored with them. By allowing apps to access photos you provide them with much more
information than intended. Privacy policies are written to be easy to read yet leave massive loopholes for
data collection and resale.
“We never sell your data” means that the company does not sell data directly but does provide all data to
their “partners.” Partners is merely a term for other companies that pay to have access to data collected by
the app. Applications track every “like”, post, friend/relationship, “check-in” and message. Others collect
sensor information directly from your device including location, recent contacts, acceleration, even
camera and microphone status.
Based on this information please answer the questions below.

Q6: Privacy policies of the top five apps state they do not sell users data. Do you believe that using the
term “Business Partner” is a deceptive way to try to ease end users worries about profiting from user
data?
•
•

Yes
No

Q7: When allowing apps to access your images (required to post images on sites) you are allowing access
to the location data included in those images. Are companies taking advantage of users who are unaware
of technical capabilities?
•
•

Yes
No
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Q8: What data do you believe is acceptable for an app to use for profit? Check those you would allow a
company to sell.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Information I have provided such as age or race (user profile information)
What posts I like or share
Events and activities I like or share
My friends or connections within the application
My home internet address or geographic location
My mobile phone number
Non-system files on my device
Chat or message conversations with contacts
Data from websites I visit or installed apps
Contacts listed in my device or computer
Places I’ve been
None of the above.

Q9: If you knew that all the data listed in question 8 was collected by your most used application, would
you still use it?
•
•

Yes
No

Q10: By using more services/applications you are agreeing to allow them the use of your data. Should
companies be required to ask users to “opt-in” for different data access?
•
•

Yes
No

